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Abstract
The purpose of this manuscript is to review the current status of
conceptions of learning in children and to consider some areas of neglect.
The main premise is that although we have made considerable strides in our
understanding of the learning process, essential developmental formulations
of growth and change have been poorly articulated. Overreliance on the
dominant theories of adult cognition is implicated and a return to a
consideration of developmental issues within a framework of comparative
psychology advocated.
Preliminary steps for a revived theory of development and learning are
described. These include a consideration of such topics as compatibility or
naturalness, accessibility and flexibility of learning, and processes of
induction. A three-pronged attack on the investigation of essential
features of learning is suggested. This would include: (a) detailed
specification of developmental progressions and trajectories within a
domain, (b) microgenetic considerations of learning within a subject over
time, and (c) engineering change via the intervention of supportive others.
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Learning and Development: The Problems
of Compatibility, Access, and Induction
My main purpose in this paper is to give a brief summary of the state
of the art in the field of memory development, concentrating on the
sophistication of our understanding of the problems now compared with a
decade ago. I would then like to consider some neglected issues concerning
developmental constraints on learning and problems of growth and change that
are largely ignored in our theories of memory as they currently stand.
The general topics I will address can most parsimoniously be summed
under the title learning. This may come as somewhat of a surprise since
contemporary cognitive developmentalists, myself included, appear to go to
extraordinary lengths to avoid using the word learning at all. It is not
merely a problem of elaborate synonym substitutions; we no longer seem to
have an area called learning at all. For those who are made uncomfortable
by the term, I suggest that you substitute the compound memory-and-
comprehension for learning in the first part of the paper, an awkward
practice that is commonly observed by writers in this area, then gradually
fade in the term learning proper in the second half of the paper, where its
somewhat distinct meaning from "memory-and-comprehension" will be
emphasized.
In the first part of the paper, I will concentrate on the enormous
gains we have made in the last decade in developing a rich description of
the development of academic skills. The importance of learning theories,
Learning and Development
3
computer metaphors, and schema models in helping us develop that picture
will be emphasized. In the second part, I will consider developmental
psychology as a branch of comparative psychology and will focus on some
tricky problems of growth and development that our dependence on computer
metaphors and traditional learning models has led us to underrepresent.
If one considers some commonly agreed upon theories of learning that
have emerged in the last decade, a skeletal prototype can readily be
extracted--that is, it could be if one were able to locate the pertinent
literature, for rarely does the term learning appear undisguised in the
title. The most extensive treatments have been made by developmental
psychologists interested in memory and by cognitive psychologists under two
guises, cognitive science and instructional psychology; the cast of
characters remains the same, but the title changes depending on whether they
are presenting applied or basic personas. According to these sources, the
acquisition of expertise (or the development of memory) involves the
development and refinement of four interrelated forms of knowledge, factual
knowledge and strategic knowledge, both of which can be subdivided into
domain-specific and general. Let me emphasize that the "theory" I am about
to describe is by no means uncontroversial, and is far more simplistic than
any real existing theory. The prototype theory is meant merely to
illustrate some problems with the state of the field.
The prototype theory goes something like this: novices differ from
experts (younger children from older ones, slower learners from brighter
ones) in terms of their repertoire of strategic skills and their factual
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information. Some of the knowledge that is acquired through experience is
domain-specific and some transcends any particular problem or subject area.
Consider first factual knowledge. Increasing expertise involves not only
the accumulation of more facts but the tighter organization of the
information into chunks, categories, scripts, frames, schemata, networks,
etc., depending on one's theoretical predilections. Concomitant with the
greater organizational coherence is faster access to accumulated knowledge
via multiple alternate pathways, more elaborated connections, redundant
couplings, densely clustered networks, hierarchical-categorical systems, etc.
--again according to one's theoretical biases and preferred terminology.
Consider next strategies. Experts have greater strategic knowledge
than novices and again that knowledge can be both general problem-solving
know-how or it can be domain-specific procedural knowledge. General
strategies include the kinds of self-management, self-inquiry routines that
developmental psychologists have called metacognitive skills (Brown, 1975,
1978; Flavell, Note 1) or metastrategies (Chi, in press), and cognitive
psychologists are coming to call metastatements (Anzai & Simon, 1979), or
metacomponents (Sternberg, 1980). These include monitoring, checking,
planning, revising, reality testing, etc. (Brown, 1978; Brown & DeLoache,
1978) but also such things as means-end analyses, strategic goal path
selection, etc. Specific strategies obviously depend on the task, and most
descriptions of learning in semantically rich, formal domains of knowledge
involve the specification of specialized strategies and procedures for
operating within that domain.
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In short, experts differ from novices in that they know more--they
knows more pertinent facts, their knowledge is better organized, they have
more strategies to guide performance and ensure cognitive economy in their
domains of expertise, and the mature expert may have more transsituational
strategies for problem solving in general. I would like to argue that
despite the appearance of this coherent, agreed-upon theory of learning,
what we have in the prototype theory is open to the criticism that it is
trivial. One reason it is open to this criticism is that the average child
on the street would come up with a description very similar to the prototype
(Brown & Chi, Note 2). Another, more serious, criticism is that not only is
the theory self-evident but it is silent, or at least obscure, concerning
how gains in expertise come about (Brown, 1979). Although we would all
agree that the expert (older child, etc.) knows more facts and has more
strategies, we have very little to say about how the expert made the
transition from novice. And, embarrassing as it may be for developmental
psychologists, we have little to say about what might be the major
differences between the child and the adult novice. I will return to these
questions later, for I would like to begin by emphasizing the advances we
have made rather than concentrating on issues we have difficulty addressing.
To do this, I would like to introduce a simple little learning model.
A Simple Little Learning Model
The larger part of developmental memory research conducted in the late
sixties and throughout the seventies has led to the establishment of a
fairly detailed picture of how the child becomes a school expert; i.e., how
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the young learner acquires academic skills and comes to know how to learn
deliberately (Brown, 1975, 1978; Bransford, Stein, Shelton, & Owings, 1980).
Insert Figure 1 about here
To illustrate the current state of our knowledge, I would like to
introduce the diagram in Figure 1, which I borrowed from Bransford (1979)
who in turn borrowed it from Jenkins (1979), who used it to illustrate a
tetrahedral model of memory. At first glance this seems like a simple
little model, particularly in comparison with the elaborate flow diagrams
favored by modern cognitive psychologists imprinted on the computer in their
formative years. Unfortunately, as is usually the case in psychology, the
simple little model becomes more complex on closer examination. But it does
provide a useful aid to help us consider the major factors that must be
taken into account when considering any aspect of learning or remembering.
Let me stress that not only must we, the psychologists, consider the
tetrahedral nature of the learning process, but this is exactly what the
expert learner must come to consider.
The diagram is meant to represent the learning situation, i.e., the
learner-in-context. There are a minimum of four factors that comprise the
learner-in-context, and these factors interact in nontrivial ways. First I
will consider the four factors independently, and then describe some two-way
interactions, hint at some three-way interactions, and stop there. Anyone
who knows about interpretation of four-way interactions will guess why. But
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this progression, from looking at one aspect of the learner in context to
considering increasingly complex interactions, mirrors the progression of
our theory development in the area of learning. The four minimum factors
are 1) the learner's activity, 2) the characteristics of the learner, 3) the
nature of the materials to be learned, and 4) the criterial task: what end
product is required from the learner? I will give only a few brief
illustrations of the types of factors that have been considered under each
of these rubrics and then provide a few randomly selected examples of the
interactive nature of the model (for more detailed treatments of the adult
literature, see Bransford, 1979; Jenkins, 1979; and for the developmental
literature, see Brown, Bransford, & Ferrara, in press).
Learnina Activities
One of the most established facts in developmental theory is the active
strategic nature of learning. We have a very rich picture of the
development of strategies for learning and remembering and quite convincing
evidence that efficient performance in a wide variety of tasks is in large
part dependent on the appropriate activities the subject engages in while
learning, either on his own volition, when trained to do so, or even when
tricked into doing so by means of a cunning incidental orienting task. As
children mature, they gradually acquire a basic repertoire of these skills,
first appearing as isolated task-dependent actions but gradually evolving
into flexible, generalizable skills. With extensive use, strategic
intervention may become so dominant that it takes on many of the
characteristics of automatic and unconscious processing, in that only
Learning and Development
8
intensive introspective questioning can reveal the operations of the
strategic device even to the operator (Brown, 1975, 1978, 1979; Brown &
Campione, in press).
Under instructions to remember, the mature learner employs a variety of
acquisition and retrieval strategies which are not available to the
developmentally less mature individual. There is also an implicit
assumption that there exists a hierarchy of strategies from simple processes
like labelling and rote rehearsal, to elaborate attempts to extract or
impose meaning and organization on the to-be-remembered material. Indeed,
one outstanding feature of mature memorizers is the amazing array of complex
transformations they will bring to even the simplest laboratory task.
Developmental differences are determined in part by the degree to which
increasingly complex strategic skills can be applied. Finally, whereas it
may be possible to distinguish certain basic skills children must acquire,
once they have mastered these it is no longer possible to define an optimal
task strategy, for the optimal strategy for any one subject will depend on
that subject's success or failure with previous strategies, estimation of
his or her own capabilities, creativity, certain personality variables, in
fact, the subject's personal cognitive style (Brown, 1975).
Although this is one area where we have been very successful at
providing a rich description of development, there are still some holes in
the picture. The most notable one is the relative absence of a detailed
consideration of the early emergence of plans and strategies of learning.
Although there is increasing activity in this area (DeLoache & Brown, 1979),
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it is still true that our knowledge about early cognition, other than
language development, is extremely limited and rather negative, consisting
of many more descriptions of what young children cannot do, than of what
they can do (Brown & DeLoache, 1978). Rochel Gelman (1978) gives examples
of exceptions to this rule and compelling reasons why we arrived at this
position.
Briefly, we have been concerned primarily with the competencies that
define the school-aged child, specifically the shift to more adequate
understanding that occurs at between 5-7 years. To illustrate with an
example from the memory literature, until recently the bulk of studies
concerned rote learning of lists and the emergence of rehearsal or
categorization as tools to enhance performance. These strategies tend to
emerge in a recognizable form at about 5 and are well established by about 8
years of age. This fact has placed a limitation on what we have learned
about the early development of strategic intervention. Probably the most
important deficiency is that the tasks are set up in such a way that we
cannot say anything about nonproducers; if children are not, for example,
rehearsing on our task, we have no way of knowing what it is that they are
doing.
Apart from providing a baseline from which improvement with age can be
measured, the inclusion of the younger or less efficient group in these
enterprises provides little information. These children perform poorly, and
therefore highlight the improvement with age we wish to demonstrate. But we
know nothing about their state of understanding. They are characterized as
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not being at a certain level, of not having a certain attribute; they are
nonproducers, nonconservers, nonmediators; they are not strategic or not
planful; they lack number concepts, reversible operations, or transitivity,
etc. They are sometimes described as passive, even though the tasks are
designed so that the only way to be characterized as active is to produce
the desired strategy. All of these descriptions are based on what young
children do not do compared with older children, rather than what they can
do; for we have no way of observing this in the confines of the tasks
selected for study (Brown & DeLoache, 1978; Gelman, 1978).
The resultant picture of memory development then is a virtual wasteland
in our knowledge of how memory develops after the first 8 months or so
(Cohen, DeLoache, & Strauss, 1979) and before the infamous 5-to-7 shift
(Brown & DeLoache, 1978; White, 1965). This is an unfortunate lack for
several major reasons. First, there is the obvious reason that a theory or
even a description of human growth cannot begin to be complete if it is
silent on development during a period of extremely rapid growth. Second, a
case could be made that early learning not only forms the basis of later
learning but is in some sense qualitatively different from later learning.
The strong instantiation of this claim would be a version of the critical
period notion, a weaker form would be more akin to Hebb's (1958) famous
distinction between early and late learning. I will return to the primacy
of early learning later, but it does seem unfortunate that we have little
empirical evidence or theoretical speculation concerning early learning
comparable to that of theorists working in language development (Newport, in
press; Slobin, 1977),
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The third reason that this lack of information about early learning
activities is to be regretted has to do with social policy. Federal Law 94-
142 mandates that school districts be responsible for the education of the
handicapped from age 3 onwards, and compulsory screening for cognitive
deficits is being established nationally. It is not clear to me how one can
screen intelligently for early signs of aberrant development without an
adequate picture of what is normal.
The Characteristics Qf the Learner
The repertoire of strategic activities that a learner can bring to the
learning context is only one characteristic of the learner that is relevant
and influential to our tetrahedral model. Learners vary in what they know
and what they can do, and these factors must influence how they learn. The
factual and strategic information of the knowledge base obviously interacts
in non-trivial ways (Chi, in press), and the problems of how the knowledge
base grows, changes, and reorganizes are the quintessential developmental
questions.
What do our current information processing models have to say about the
knowledge base? First, the knowledge base is seen as the repository of
rules, strategies, and operations which can be used to make more efficient
use of a limited capacity system; young children and novices have not yet
acquired a rich repertoire of these routines, as we saw above. In addition,
the child's knowledge base is said to be deficient in at least three ways:
(a) the amount of information it contains, (b) the organization and internal
coherence of that information, and (c) the number of available routes by
Learning and Development
12
which it can be reached. These differences impose several limitations on
the child's information-processing abilities. Such basic cognitive
processes as speed of encoding, naming, and recognition (Chi, 1976) are all
influenced by restrictions imposed by an impoverished knowledge base.
Although this is undoubtedly true, we are still far from achieving insights
into qualitative growth mechanisms. How does the system become rich, rather
than impoverished, if by that we mean more than a mere accumulation of
facts? How does the organization and internal cohesion of information
change qualitatively with age?
And then there is the problem of capacity! A major characteristic of
the learner is his working memory capacity. While few would doubt that the
human information processor is restricted by a limited working capacity (see
Neisser, 1976, for discussion, however), and that children functionally are
more restricted by capacity limitations than adults, there is considerable
controversy concerning whether capacity per se (rather than use of capacity)
develops with age (Chi, 1976; Huttenlocher & Burke, 1976). Again, although
we have made great strides in describing functional capacity limitations in
children, the essential developmental issue of whether there are age changes
in capacity per se is open to debates of some complexity.
Another characteristic of the learner that must enter into the learner-
in-context equation is self-knowledge, including the learner's knowledge
about his or her own cognitive competence--one of the characteristics of the
learner examined by those developmental psychologists interested in
metacognition (notably Flavell, 1971a, Note 1). I will return to this topic
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later. Still missing from this somewhat casual list of the learners'
characteristics is any mention of emotional factors such as attitudes,
opinions, beliefs, prejudices, fears of failure, etc., all important factors
in determining the efficiency of any learning activity.
Materials to be Learned
Another important influence on effective learning is the nature of the
material that must be acquired. Whether there is organization inherent in
the material, and if so, the type of organization it is, will clearly
influence the learning process. Good exemplars of categories afford the
activity of categorization (Rosch, 1979), prose material that is compatible
with the reader's preexisting knowledge is more likely to be understood
(Anderson, 1977; Brown, 1975; Trabasso, 1980). Stories that conform to
canonical form are easily retained (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn,
1979). For a detailed review of the importance of organizational factors
see Mandler (1979).
Criterial Task
Learning is not undertaken in a vacuum; there is always an end product
in mind, and the effective learner is cognizant of this end product and
tailors his learning activities accordingly (Baker & Brown, in press;
Bransford, Nitsch, & Franks, 1977; Brown, 1978, 1979). Learners need to
know whether the demand is for gist rather than verbatim recall, for
recognition rather than reconstruction or recall in a memory task (Brown,
1975). They need to know if memory for the material is required as the end
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product, or whether they will be called upon to apply the acquired
information to novel instances (Nitsch, 1977). In short, learners'
activities are purposive and goal-directed and the nature of the criterial
task will play an important role in determining the effective activity that
must be undertaken.
Thus the four points on the figure represent important ingredients in
the learner-in-context formula. Indeed it is difficult to talk about them
in isolation because the four elements work interactively to determine
learning, and it is only by considering the total picture that one can fully
understand the learning situation. In the early days of memory development
research the focus was usually on just one aspect of the tetrahedron: i.e.,
Is recall easier than recognition (criterial task)? Do strategies develop
with age (learning activity)? Is the material to be learned pictures or
words (nature of the materials)? Is the material compatible with the
learners' prior knowledge (characteristic of the learner)? As our
understanding of the complexity of the learner-in-context formula has
developed, we see a far greater concentration on the interactive nature of
the learning process. Most current developmental work focuses on at least
two-way interactions of the model and there are some attempts to consider
three-way interactions. Here I will give a few examples to illustrate this
greater focus on the interactive nature of learning.
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Interactive Nature of Learning
Let us begin by considering some potential interactions of the
knowledge base and the learning activity. One of the basic issues that has
guided the emergence of the now popular area of study, metacognition, is
that it is not sufficient to "have" (in the sense of be available in the
knowledge base) knowledge or strategies, unless one can use them effectively
in the learning process. Learners who are not aware of their own
limitations, or strengths, or of their own strategic repertoire, can hardly
be expected to apply appropriate strategies flexibly, and precisely in tune
with task demands. There is considerable evidence of the immature learner
failing to capitalize on the resources available to him (Brown, 1978;
Flavell, Note 1). And it is quite clear that the information that is "in"
the knowledge base is not always used effectively by adults (Gick & Holyoak,
Note 3), never mind children (Brown & Campione, in press).
The immature often fail to capitalize on information they have. For
example, young children and retarded persons can only with great difficulty
be persuaded to use categorical information as a deliberate aid to learning,
but this does not mean that their knowledge is not organized categorically.
Consider the semantic priming task. In one example of this task, the
learner is required to name pictures as rapidly as possible. Sometimes a
target picture (cat) is preceded by a conceptually related item (bear) and
sometimes by an unrelated item (train). Speed of naming the target is more
rapid if it is preceded by a related item. The conceptual category is said
to be "primed" by the related, preceding category. Sperber, Ragain, and
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McCauley (1976) used a priming task to assess the conceptual knowledge
available to retarded individuals and found clear evidence of category
organization. The simple category structure is in some sense available in
memory although retarded learners are generally quite unable to harness the
information in order to design an effective strategy for learning.
Similarly, children show release from proactive inhibition upon a change in
category membership at a very early age, well before the emergence of
categorization as a deliberate memory strategy.
Another form of information that is often available but not necessarily
accessible is strategic knowledge, and this is such a common finding in the
developmental literature that it has a name--production deficiencies
(Flavell, 1970). We do not always employ the appropriate strategies for
learning even if we have them available. The immature learner is mucIT less
likely to use his or her knowledge appropriately, as is demonstrated in the
robust findings of maintenance and generalization failures following
strategy training (Brown, 1974; Brown & Campione, 1978, in press).
Effective learning, then, is not simply a matter of acquiring the necessary
informational background and strategic routines. It is as much a problem of
adequate use and control of the routines available to the system--of
accessing and using the resources one has (Brown & Campione, in press). I
will return to the problem of access later.
Now let us turn to potential interactions involving the knowledge base
and the nature of the materials. If there is compatibility between the
organization and information in the knowledge base and the organization and
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information inherent in the material, learning will be enhanced. This is
the basic notion behind the concept of headfitting, introduced by Jenkins
(1971) and Brown (1975, 1979). The basic premise is that there is an
intimate relation between what is currently known and what can be readily
acquired. Because we must come to know more with increasing age and
experience, there must be a close correspondence between what a child can
understand at any point in his life and his concurrent cognitive status.
The assumption is that material is comprehensible or not, easily learned or
not, to the extent that it maps onto the preexisting knowledge and
preferences of the learners. Extreme versions of this approach suggest that
if material is highly compatible, understanding will be "automatic" (Brown,
1975; Jenkins, 1974). The ultimate demonstration of the headfitting notion
is one that should be readily found in a developmental literature. Ideally,
little thinkers lacking some basic knowledge should be hindered in their
comprehension of any novel information that presupposes the existence of
that prior knowledge. This fact can readily be found in studies that
examine children's comprehension of texts (Baker & Brown, in press;
Trabasso, 1980).
One nice example of the interactive influence of the knowledge base is
the problem of individualized instruction. Quite simply, if one is to
instruct a child to perform in a way he previously could not, the most
intelligent way to proceed is to find out where he is coming from, i.e., to
estimate his starting level of competence. It is a widespread assumption of
developmental psychologists of quite divergent theoretical viewpoints that
Learning and Development
18
the distance between the child's existing knowledge, and the new information
he must acquire, is a critical determinant of how successful training will
be. Siegler's elegant rule-assessment approach has been successful in
revealing the primitive rules children use before attaining full
understanding of a variety of scientific concepts, such as torque,
probability, conservation, etc. and of methods of inducing children to apply
a more sophisticated rule than their original level (Siegler, in press).
Another nice demonstration of the headfitting notion is Chi's (1978; in
press) examples of mature strategy use in little learners who for some
reason have well developed knowledge bases, e.g., chess players or dinosaur
afficionados. Chi's twist is that in her sample of chess players knowledge
is inversely related to age. In general, the children are the experts while
the adults are the novices. It is the experts (children) who outperform the
novices both in terms of actual memory performance and in predicting in
advance how well they will perform--a nice example of the headfitting
notion.
As a final demonstration of the interactive nature of learning consider
the two-way interaction of learning activities and criterial task. If
learning activities are purposive and goal-directed, an appropriate learning
activity must be one that is compatible with the desired end state. One
cannot, therefore, discuss appropriate learning activities unless one
considers the question "appropriate for what end?" A well-known example of
this principle is the work on encoding specificity. The compatibility
between the context within which material is acquired and the context within
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which it must be retrieved is an important determinant of retrieval
efficiency (Cermak & Craik, 1979).
Bransford and colleagues (Bransford, Franks, Morris, & Stein, 1977)
introduced the term transfer appropriate processing to deal with the
compatibility between the learning activity and the goal of that activity.
Traditionally, learning studies have relied almost exclusively upon accuracy
of memory in measuring the success of learning, but this practice can lead
one to neglect some important aspects of learning that are necessary for
valuable kinds of transfer. Knowledge in a form that permits optimal memory
need not be in an appropriate form to be used to understand a novel input
(Nitsch, 1977). Several studies from Bransford's laboratory and from our
laboratory have adopted the position that if you want to achieve use of
knowledge or transfer of training it seems reasonable to concentrate on
activities that help people understand the significance of information and
its potential use, rather than concentrating merely on rote learning of the
information. For example, whereas the mnemonic strategy of imagining
bizarre interactive images or elaborated verbal codes is of excellent use in
improving rote recall of paired-associate lists, or unusual names or facts,
it is not clear that such a technique would be the best one for
understanding the meaning of the facts in a passage. If rote recall is the
criterial task, mnemonic techniques are of undoubted value. If
understanding and use of the relevant facts is the desired end product,
activities that focus on clarifying the significance of the facts are much
more likely to succeed (Bransford, Stein, Shelton, & Owings, 1980). In
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short, an optimal learning strategy can only be determined relative to the
uses to which the acquired knowledge will subsequently be put.
Although I have emphasized some "simple" two-way interactions of the
model, I would like to repeat that an adequate characterization of the
learning process must consider the complex interaction of all four factors.
Learning activities can only be tailored appropriately if the task demands,
the nature of the material, and the information in the knowledge base are
all considered. For example, consider learning from texts. Any strategy
one might adopt would be influenced by the test to which the learning must
be put (gist recall, resolving ambiguities, acquiring basic concepts, etc.),
the inherent structure of the material (its syntactic, semantic, and
structural complexity, its adherence to a good form, etc.), and the extent
to which its informational content is compatible with existing knowledge.
When one considers this, it is no wonder that developmental cognitive
research is becoming more complex.
Expertise
As psychologists we must come to understand the four basic factors of
the tetrahedral model and how they interact with each other to influence
learning. I would like to argue that this is exactly what efficient
learners must do. Before they can become experts, children must develop the
same insights into the demands of the learning situation as psychologists.
They must know about their own characteristics, their available learning
activities, the demand characteristics of various learning tasks, and the
inherent structure of materials. They must tailor their activities finely
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to the competing demands of all these forces in order to be flexible and
effective learners. In other words, they must learn how jt learn.
Becoming an expert is the process of acquiring knowledge about the
rules, strategies, or goals needed for efficient performance. When faced
with a new type of learning situation , anyone is a novice to a certain
extent and children are universal novices (Brown & DeLoache, 1978). Novices
often fail to perform efficiently not only because they may lack certain
skills but because they are deficient in terms of self-conscious
participation and intelligent self-regulation of their actions. The novice
tends not to know much about either his capabilities on a new task or the
techniques necessary to perform efficiently; he may even have difficulty
determining what goals are desirable, let alone what steps are required to
get there. Note that this innocence is not necessarily age-related, but can
merely be a function of inexperience in a new problem situation. Adults and
children often display similar confusion when confronted with a new problem:
Chi's (1978) novice chess players (adults) have many of the same problems
that Markman's (1977) very small card players experience. For both, the
situation is relatively new and difficult. Barring significant transfer
from prior experience, the beginner in any problem-solving situation has not
developed the necessary knowledge about how and what to think under the new
circumstances.
We are beginning to see in the literature many examples where the
acquisition of expertise in a domain by adults looks very similar to the
development of academic learning skills by children (Brown & Chi, Note 2).
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Indeed one might reasonably ask what developmental psychologists have to say
that is uniquely developmental, i.e., what is it that we study other than
the acquisition of expertise, which could quite easily be studied by
considering the passage from novice to expert in adult subjects? As
developmental psychologists, if we cannot answer that question, we are again
admitting that essential formulations of cognitive growth across the life
span have not been well articulated. What does distinguish the child from
the adult novice? Note that in considering the tetrahedral model, the term
age need never occur, a problem that has led to the self-conscious use of
joint terms like age-and-experience to denote expertise.
In the preceding sections, I have concentrated on what we know about
the learning situation as psychologists and what the child must come to know
in order to be an expert learner. I have argued that indeed we do know a
great deal about the constraints on learning that derive from a deficient
knowledge base and inefficient use of a limited capacity system. I have
pointed out that we can characterize the demands of a learning situation
quite adequately, pinpoint problems of the novice, and describe the
developmental progression towards expertise. Although we have made
extraordinary strides in our ability to describe the course of cognitive
growth, we have lagged behind in our ability to characterize the nature of
the growth process itself. Most of our theories of growth either ignore the
fundamental issues of change and development or are extremely vague about
the topic. Mechanisms that promote change and growth are the essential
issues of a theory of human learning (Brown, 1979). In the next section, I
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will speculate about some of the reasons why developmental psychologists
have been less concerned with essential learning and growth issues than one
might expect.
Models f Psychology and the Questions of Growth and Learnina
Although many would agree with Neisser (1976) that "No theory that
fails to acknowledge the possibility of development can be taken seriously
as an account of human cognition" (p. 62), there are historical reasons why
consideration of developmental issues has been constrained, and I would like
to trace some of these briefly here. It is often claimed that one of the
things wrong with developmental psychology is that insufficient attention is
paid to theories of adult cognition. However, for the sake of argument, I
would like to make a strong counterclaim that historically we have been
overly influenced by the fashions of experimental psychology.
Consider the adult models available for us. The history of mainstream
psychology in this country has been dominated by three major movements: the
macro-model learning theories, the computer metaphors of information
processing, and the recent schema-theoretic formulations. These movements
have been extremely influential and have spawned powerful derivative
theories for those interested in children's learning. But they have
characteristic features that make them improbable models for a science of
human growth.
Learning and Development
24
Traditional Learning Theories
The prototypical examples of the all-encompassing learning theories are
those of Hull (1943), Skinner (1938), and Tolman (1932). Although the
critical differences between these theories were sufficiently compelling to
occupy empirical psychology for thirty years, they also share common
features that make them less than ideal models for developmental psychology.
All derived their primary data base from rats and pigeons learning arbitrary
things in restricted situations. All three hoped that their systems would
have almost limitless applicability. True to a creed of pan-associationism,
they shared a belief that laws of learning of considerable generality and
precision could be found, and that there were certain basic principles of
learning that could be applied uniformly and universally across all kinds of
learning and all kinds of species. These principles were thought of as
species-indifferent, activity-indifferent, and context-indifferent.
The theories had very little to say about species variation. Attempts
were made to place animal species (also humans differing in age) on a ladder
of increasing intellectual capacity. For example, fish were designated less
intelligent than rats because they displayed less of a certain type of
learning (Bitterman, 1965). But the skills selected as measures of
intelligence were quite arbitrary (species-independent), as indeed were the
situations selected in which to test the presence/absence of the skills
(e.g., impoverished environments where the skills to be learned had no
adaptive value for the species in question). In summary of this type of
enterprise, it has been said (Rozin, 1976; Schwartz, 1974) that by studying
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the behavior of pigeons in arbitrary situations we learned nothing about the
behavior of pigeons in nature, but a great deal about the behavior of people
in arbitrary situations.
The theories had very little to say about developmental issues. The
growth of the knowledge base was simply incremental. Although later there
were some attempts to deal with reorganization of small basic units into
larger complex forms, it was by no means dominant in these theories, and by
no means an unqualified success. Children learned by the same rules as
adults (or pigeons for that matter), and the result of experience was seen
as an accumulation of associations varying in strength, with strength
determined by the amount and recency of reinforcement/contiguity relations.
In short, the theories did not confer special status to age or species
differences, and thus provided a barren metaphor for those whose primary
goal is to understand human growth and learning.
Computer Metaphors
Although the information-processing features of the computer metaphor
have been used successfully to expand our knowledge of developmental issues
in cognition, it too has serious limitations for a model of human growth.
The dominant computer metaphor model that influenced the growth of
psychological theory was one that concentrated on the flow of information in
and between major architectural structures of the system (STM, LTM, etc.).
The primary issues were when, where, and how, rather than what information
is processed. Shaw and Bransford (1977) characterized the systems as
"mechanistic," "purposeless," and "passive." A system that cannot grow, or
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show adaptive modification to a changing environment, is a strange metaphor
for human thought processes which are constantly changing over the life span
of the individual and the evolution of the species. Let me emphasize that
this does not mean that computer systems cannot in any sense learn. Many
models now exist that concentrate on acquisition mechanisms (Anzai & Simon,
1979; Anderson, Kline, & Beasley, Note 4), and many programs are now quite
efficient at modeling how expert systems work (Larkin, Heller, & Greeno,
1980). But again, "modeling expert systems tells us about what an expert
knows, not about how he was capable of becoming an expert" (Schank, 1980).
And although one can argue that computer systems can learn, the dominant
computer metaphor that has influenced the development of psychological
theory is a static one (Flores & Winograd, Note 5). Further, there are
surely few who would claim that artificial systems will ever be capable of
the basic growth and learning mechanisms of natural man, adaptation to a
natural environment (Boden, 1977).
Turvey and Shaw (Note 6) wish to differentiate natural systems from
artificial ones because the types of systems differ in whether or not
meaning and intentionality can be ascribed to them. Unlike the information
acquired by animals as a result of interaction with a meaningful
environment, the data "acquired" by a computer is not of any intrinsic
interest to that computer. It is an external human agent that has interest
in the data for reasons quite unspecified to the machine. It is also
difficult to see how a machine can be seen as having intentionality, a
dominant force in human learning.
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As meaning and intentionality arise spontaneously and are fundamental
features of human thought, this difference is indeed a crucial one (Flores &
Winograd, Note 5). Equally crucial for developmental psychologists is the
problem of growth. Neisser (1976) claims that computer models lack one
essential element, accommodation. He claims that artificial intelligence
systems have not modeled cognitive development because
The development of human intelligence occurs in a real environment with
coherent properties of its own. Many of these properties vary greatly
from one situation to another; others remain invariant at a deeper
lvel. As long as programs do not represent this environment
systematically, in at least some of its complexity, they cannot
represent cognitive growth either. (pp. 143-144)
Thus for Neisser, as well as for ecological theorists (Shaw &
Bransford, 1977; Turvey & Shaw, Note 6), the minimum unit of analysis must
be the activity of an organism in its natural environmental niche.
Schema Theories
A promising direction in the growth of computer models is the
incorporation of schema-like entities into their conceptualization.
Minsky's (1975) frame notion, which has been favored by workers in the
Artificial Intelligence field (Charniak, 1975; Winograd, 1975), and Schank's
scripts and plans are basically schema notions (Schank & Abelson, 1975).
The major impetus for the development of schema notions has been an attempt
to deal with the question of reorganization of knowledge as a function of
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experience, a quintessential learning problem. These theories have been
extremely successful additions to the basic information processing models
and have given them a rich new metaphor with which to describe how people
think. These theories also have limitations for growth models, however,
that I have dealt with in detail elsewhere (Brown, 1979). Briefly, the
problem is still one of accommodation.
The major scaffolding of schema theories seems to be some version of
the Piagetian assimilation and accommodation interaction, or the reflection,
refraction transactions of Soviet dialectic theories (Wozniak, 1975).
Assimilation is the function by which the events of the world are
incorporated into preexisting knowledge structures, while accommodation is
the process by which the existing knowledge structures are modified in
accordance with novel events. By the reciprocal influence of input-on
preexisting concepts and of extant knowledge on input the thinker comes to
know his world. There are nontrivial problems associated with both terms,
particularly concerning the problem of epistemic mediation (Shaw &
Bransford, 1977; Turvey, 1978). Here we will just concentrate on the
problem of growth.
A major criticism of schema theories in adult cognition is that they
are basically assimilation models. Mechanisms which permit acquisition and
articulation of schemata are not specified in sufficient detail to afford an
adequate developmental perspective. How are existing conceptions modified
in the face of inconsistent input? How do such theories deal with novelty
(H6ffding, 1891)? To say that "learning may be dealt with by supposing that
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when a radically new input is encountered a (new schema) without variables
is constructed" (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977) does not tell us either how we
know it is a new input or how we construct a new schema. Similarly it is
undoubtedly true that much schema growth can be accounted for by the twin
processes of schema generalization and schema specification (Rumelhart &
Ortony, 1977), but the theories are quite vague concerning the mechanisms
and contexts which would permit such development.
An adequate theory must be able to account for growth not only with
regard to gradual extension and refinement of schemata, but also with
respect to major changes in perspective (Anderson, 1977) or paradigmatic
shifts of theory or world view (Kuhn, 1970). It must also deal with
emotionally-based resistance to such major cognitive reorganization, for it
is true that inconsistencies and counterexamples are often assimilated into
schemata to which a person is heavily committed, as Abelson's (1973) Cold
Warrior example can illustrate. Accommodation is not the necessary result
of inconsistent input. What then would constitute necessary or sufficient
conditions for a schema shift, or major accommodation, to occur? How does
our preexisting knowledge change as a function of experience? By gradual
extension? By dynamic shifts in perspectives? Many of the interesting
questions concerning schema theory are left tantalizingly unanswered.
I do not want to give the impression that developmental schema theories
have answered these questions any more satisfactorily, for they too have
been adept at avoiding the basic issue of growth by describing what develops
rather than concentrating on how growth occurs. Indeed, just as a major
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problem with adult models is that they are generally silent on the issue of
how thinking systems grow or change, so, too, a major objection to many
developmental models is that at best they provide a description of the
stages or states of development but cannot account for the transformations
that lead to growth. There has been considerable disagreement surrounding
even such basic issues as whether cognitive growth is a continuous process
that proceeds slowly and gradually or whether it consists of a set of abrupt
stage-like leaps (Flavell, 1971b; Toussaint, 1974; Brainerd, 1978).
Consider the pivotal developmental schema model, Piaget's theory, which
rests on his changing notion of equilibration, seen by some to be a
homeostatic mechanism (Riegel, 1975). The organism is constantly seeking
balance and stability. Every interaction with the environment precipitates
a compensating equilibration activity consisting of both an assimilative and
accommodative function. The end state of these reciprocal forces is
balance. A problem here is that such a homeostatic notion would serve to
maintain a child at a given level of development, and one major issue has
been how Piaget extracts himself from the dilemma of providing a basically
homeostatic model to account for growth.
Piaget is not as insensitive to this issue as some of his critics would
have us believe (Riegel, 1974), and in his more recent writings he has
introduced the homeorhetic (Pufall, 1977) processes of physical and
reflective abstraction (Piaget, 1970, 1971). These are not easy concepts to
come to grips with and luckily, for my purposes here, it is sufficient to
point out that the major questions that Piaget is attempting to answer in
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his more recent work focus on the problem of growth. Indeed, Riegel (1974)
has characterized Piaget's own development as one of three stages, the
functional, the structural, and now the transformational periods.
Thus, it would seem that even developmental theories have not yet
arrived at a satisfactory conception of change and growth; as with adult
theories the tendency is to fall back on an accumulation notion sometimes
accompanied by reference to some unspecified qualitative reorganization at
some unspecified critical stages. In defense of such theories, however, it
should be said that they do address the issue; it is a constant concern; it
is the focal point where theoretical controversy centers (Brown, 1979). For
example, the stage vs. continuous growth controversy (Flavell, 1971a), which
dominated the 1960's, centered on the problem of growth. In the 1970's,
another theoretical controversy arose, between Piagetian "structuralism" and
Soviet dialecticism as espoused by its American adherents (Riegel, 1975;
Wozniak, 1975). This controversy was nicely illustrated by the football
analogy introduced by Gardner (1973) and extended by Riegel (1974). In
order to illustrate the methods of structural analysis used by Levi-Strauss
to examine rituals and orgies of primitive societies, Gardner subjected
American football to a similar analysis. There is structure in the field,
the rules of the game, and the strategies of performance. The action is
characterized by a sequence of sudden quick actions each leading to a new
structural state where the action appears to be temporarily frozen. Riegel
believes this analogy is suitable for capturing the essence of structural
theories of growth like Piaget's early conceptions. By contrast, Riegel
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believes that dialectic theories, such as his own, can best be characterized
by analogy to soccer, a game of ceaseless action which depends on continuous
interactions between the individual members and on the transaction between
the members of opposing teams. Soccer, like dialectic theory, is a game of
continuous motion; football, like structural theory, is one of sudden
activity producing stable states. The analogy has flaws, certainly, but it
does illustrate that one of the current controversies in developmental
theory, dialecticism vs. Piagetian structuralism, is rooted in the notions
of growth and change. Whether or not these theoretical metaphors ever lead
to a concrete increase in our understanding of human growth, they at least
make us sensitive to a major problem for psychological theory.
The Missina Model: Comparative Psychologv
Unlike the preceding models of psychology, comparative theories have
been less influential for developmental psychologists, and as such, can
perhaps be referred to as the missing model. Under this heading,
comparative psychology, I mean to include a variety of disparate schools
that show a fundamental concern with the biological basis of behavior and
species-specific learning (e.g., ethologists, ecologists, neo-Gibsonians,
animal cognition theorists, etc.). Given limited space, I have restricted
myself to theories of animal learning, although I realize that I could
include under this heading comparative human cognition as represented by the
study of cross-cultural variability. Indeed, many of my concerns that
developmental psychology should be considered a branch of comparative
psychology originated from just such a consideration of comparative human
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cognition (for details of this argument see Cole & Means, 1980; Laboratory
for Comparative Human Cognition, 1978a, 1978b). Again, given limited space,
I wish to emphasize only two concepts from the comparative animal
literature, compatibility and access, in order to demonstrate how a
comparative approach might complement our developing picture of development.
Preparedness, Belongingness, Response Compatibility. A main theme of
this approach is that significant learning is closely adapted to the
species' way of life and that learning depends in very important ways on
(a) the animal who is doing the learning, (b) the behavior that is required
of it, and (c) the situation in which that behavior occurs. Thus, in order
to understand learning, one must consider the special characteristics of the
learner and the special characteristics of the environment. To introduce
the terms of neo-Gibsonians such as Turvey and Shaw (Note 6), we must
consider behavior in an ecosystem that consists of an animal's effectivities
(goal-directed functions which reflect its potential actions), an
environment (affordances), and a relationship of mutual compatibility
between the two. The emphasis is not on what the animal is or what the
environment is but on what the environment means to the animal. Animals are
active investigatory creatures who mine the world for information on a need-
to-know basis. They are constrained by their biological adaptation to their
own ecological niche.
Considerable support for the species-specificity of learning has led to
such concepts as belongingness or preparedness (Seligman, 1970) to explain
why a certain species can learn certain activities extremely rapidly in one
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context and at the same time completely fail to learn in other contexts.
For example, consider that in a "simple" aversive conditioning paradigm, how
effectively a rat can be conditioned to avoid a shock depends upon the
response required from the rat and critical features of the learning
situation. Rats learn very quickly to run or jump to escape shock, but it
is only with great difficulty that they can be trained to press a lever to
escape. But aversive stimulation naturally elicits a variety of species-
specific defense mechanisms (such as running away, jumping clear) which are,
therefore, readily available for conditioning. Other potential responses,
not related to the natural mechanism of defense (such as bar-pressing), are
depressed by fear, for obvious survival reasons and are, therefore, less
available for conditioning (Bolles, 1970).
These notions of belongingness, preparedness, and response
compatibility bring us a long way from the type of learning that was studied
during the 1930s-1940s, where rats and pigeons were set to learn arbitrary
responses to arbitrary stimuli. Animals clearly come equipped to learn
certain kinds of information very rapidly (Rozin, 1976); this is what is
meant by the animal's effectivities (Turvey & Shaw, Note 6). But species-
specific adaptation is adaptation to an environment, as can be seen even in
the "simple" aversive conditioning study just described. Jumping to avoid a
shock may be a "natural" response, but it is only readily conditioned if the
natural environmental affordances hold. For example, if the jumping
response must be made in a box with a closed lid, learning is extremely
slow, if it occurs at all. If, however, the lid is off the box, and the
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height of the walls is commensurate with the leaping ability of the rat, one-
trial learning will occur, obviously! Responding rapidly to avoid shock is
readily conditioned if and only if the animal factors and environmental
factors are compatible (Turvey & Shaw, Note 6).
If significant forms of animal learning are not species-independent,
then perhaps it would be profitable to ask about species-dependent forms of
human learning, to consider the concepts of belongingness, compatibility, or
naturalness, particularly in relationship to early learning. These
questions used to be of major interest to psychology, i.e., What are the
prewired components that constrain early learning? What natural concepts do
babies acquire readily? Are there cognitive universals of species-specific
early learning? Does early learning differ in significant ways from later
learning?
Earlier, I pointed out that because of our preoccupation with the 5-7
shift, we know very little about cognitive development in the preschool
years. Here I would like to emphasize that a focus on early learning is
called for not only because we know so little, but because many critical
questions can best be addressed by considering early learning. At this
point, the issue of prewired components, cross-cultural universals, natural
concepts, etc. have primarily been of concern to theorists who study
language acquisition (Newport, in press; Slobin, 1977; Karmiloff-Smith,
Note 7), but recent work in infant learning is encouraging (Spelke, Note 8).
We are now beginning to ask not: Can infants learn, remember, etc.? but:
What can they learn readily? Does their biological preparedness preset them
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to pick up significant events in their environment (Gibson, 1979), are there
universal categories of early learning? If there is a unique status to be
conferred on the early acquisition of a primary language, does this tell us
anything about the learning process per se (Newport, in press)? What is the
status of critical period notions and early human learning? Concepts are
formed for a reason; they have survival value in terms of their function or
use in relation to particular cultural contexts (Cassirer, 1923; Toulmin,
1972). If this is so, we might ask what concepts young children acquire
readily, and what kinds of inferences we can make from the nature of early
learning about the system we are trying to understand (Gelman & Gallistel,
1978).
Although the crucial issues concerning the privileged status of early
learning are largely unanswered at present, developmental psychologists have
considered the compatibility issue in later learning (Inhelder, Sinclair, &
Bovet, 1974). This has most often taken the form of headfitting (Jenkins,
1971; Brown, 1975, 1979) and stage-like notions (Brainerd, 1978; Flavell,
1971a; Toussaint, 1974) in theoretical arguments, and attention to the
learner's "zone of potential development" (Brown & French, 1979; Vygotsky,
1978), or "region of sensitivity to instruction" (Wood & Middleton, 1975) in
instructional psychology. The general concept of readiness for learning is
again becoming fashionable in developmental psychology (Brown, 1975, 1979;
Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Siegler, in press).
I would also like to point out that readiness for instruction in the
acquisition of scientific concepts and academic skills may not reflect
Learning and Development
37
adequately the biological preparedness of human beings for certain
significant types of learning. The academic milieu is not the natural
habitat for more than a few of our species and many basic scientific
concepts are largely unintuitive and hence difficult to learn. When
considering human potential for learning it might prove profitable to pay
greater attention to so-called everyday thinking (Cole, Hood, & McDermott,
Note 9).
Everyday problem-solving must be in response to a variety of
environmental demands to which the learner must adjust. But we know next to
nothing about demands other than those of academic settings. Both
developmental and cognitive psychologists have concentrated primarily on
academic intelligence, on the cognitive capabilities of the college
sophomore (and children on the road to that end point). Most of our
theories of adult cognition are notable for this bias. We have almost
totally ignored the everyday problem-solving of the non-academic, or even of
the academic members of our society for that matter. Again for basic
theoretical and social policy reasons I would like to call for an increased
understanding of the cognitive demands of everyday life based on a theory of
cognition that includes consideration of more than academic intelligence.
Accessibility and development. The second major point I would like to
borrow from comparative psychology is the concept of accessibility. For
example, Rozin (1976) considers intelligence as a complex, hierarchically-
organized, biological system, consisting of a repertoire of adaptive
specializations that are the components or subprograms of the system.
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Throughout the animal world there exist adaptive specializations related to
intelligence that originate to satisfy specific problems of survival.
Because they evolve as solutions to specific problems, these adaptive
specializations are originally tightly wired to a narrow set of situations
that called for their evolution. In lower organisms the adaptive
specializations remain tightly constrained components of the system. Rozin
quotes such widely known examples of prewired intelligence components as the
navigational communication ability of bees that is totally restricted to the
defined situation of food foraging (Von Frisch, 1967, but see also Gould,
1978 and Griffin, 1978), and the exceptionally accurate map memories of
gobiid fish for their own tide pool (Aronson, 1951). This form of
intelligence is tightly prewired; although it can sometimes be calibrated by
environmental influence, it is pretty much preprogrammed (bird-song
development is probably the most elegant illustration of the interplay
between prewired components and environmental tuning; Marler, 1970).
Rozin's theory is that in the course of evolution, cognitive programs become
more accessible to other units of the system and can, therefore, be used
flexibly in a variety of situations. This flexibility is the hallmark of
higher intelligence, reaching its zenith at the level of conscious control
which affords wide applicability over the full range of mental functioning.
Rozin (1976) refers to the tightly wired, limited access components in
the brain as the "cognitive unconscious," and suggests that
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part of the progress in evolution toward more intelligent organisms
could then be seen as gaining access to or emancipating the cognitive
unconscious. Minimally, a program (adaptive specialization) could be
wired into a new system or a few new systems. In the extreme, the
program could be brought to the level of consciousness, which might
serve the purpose of making it applicable to the full range of
behaviors and problems. (pp. 256-257)
Just as part of the progress in evolution toward more intelligent organisms
can be seen as gaining access to the cognitive unconscious, so too the
progress of development within higher species such as man can be
characterized as one of gaining access. Intelligent behavior is first
tightly wired to the narrow context in which it was acquired and only later
becomes extended into other domains. Thus cognitive development is the
process of proceeding from the "specific inaccessible" nature of skill to
the "general accessible" (Rozin, 1976).
There are two main points to Rozin's accessibility theory. First is
the notion of welding (Brown, 1974, 1978; Shif, 1969), that is, intelligence
components can be strictly welded to constrained domains. Skills available
in one situation are not readily used in others, even though they are
appropriate. Rozin uses this concept to explain the patchy nature of young
children's early cognitive ability, which has been described as a composite
of skills that are not necessarily covariant. Young children's programs are
"not yet usable in all situations, available to consciousness or statable"
(Rozin, 1976). Development is the process of gradually extending and
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connecting together the isolated skills with a possible ultimate extension
into consciousness.
Closely connected is the second notion of awareness or knowledge of the
system that one can use. Even if skills are widely applicable rather than
tightly welded, they need not necessarily be stable, statable and conscious.
Rozin would like to argue that much of formal education is the process of
gaining access to the rule-based components already in the head, i.e., the
process of coming to understand explicitly a system already used implicitly.
As Gelman and Gallistel (1978) point out, linguistic (and possibly natural
number) concepts are acquired very easily, early, and universally, but the
ability to talk and the ability to access the structure of the language are
not synonymous. The ability to speak does not automatically lead to an
awareness of the rules of grammar governing the language.
Pylyshyn (1978) makes a similar distinction when he distinguishes
between multiple access and reflective access. Multiple access to the
representational components governing behavior is shown by the ability to
use knowledge flexibly; i.e., a particular behavior is not delimited to a
constrained set of circumstances (the welding argument). Reflective access
refers to the ability to "mention as well as use" the components of the
system. Developmental psychologists have also made a similar distinction
between flexible use of the skills and knowledge that are available to the
system and conscious, introspective knowledge concerning the availability of
these skills (Brown & Campione, in press). Gardner (1978) further suggests
that the hallmarks of intelligence are: (a) generative, inventive, and
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experimental use of knowledge rather than preprogrammed activities (multiple
access), and (b) the ability to reflect upon one's own activity (reflective
access). Note, however, that Gardner makes the point that no organism ever
reaches a level of "total consciousness, full awareness, and constant
intentionality," for these are "emergent capacities," useful as indices for
comparative purposes both within and between species, but never perfectly
instantiated even in the mature human. To the extent that organisms come to
exhibit more and more of the qualities of reflective and multiple access, we
tend to say that they exhibit intelligent behavior. Conversely, to the
extent that behaviors
(1) appear only when elicited by strong training models, (2) recur in
virtually identical form over many occasions, (3) display little
experimental playfulness, (4) exhibit restricted coupling to a single
symbolic system, or (5) fail ever to be used to refer in 'meta' fashion
to one's own activities, we are inclined to minimize their
significance. (Gardner, 1978, p. 572)
I have used these notions of multiple and reflective access elsewhere
as a vehicle to explain the developmental training literature and the
crucial problems concerning generalization of training (Brown & Campione, in
press; Brown & Chi, Note 2). Here I would like to point out that the
accessing notion might give us some insights into the difference between
adult and child experts. The child expert could be seen as a learner who
has considerable intellectual control in one domain but can access this
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competence only in that domain. The rule he can apply to (for example)
number conservation, he cannot apply to problems of weight or volume.
Similarly the conscious control of problem solutions a child can use in one
domain he cannot employ in another (this explains the "patchy" metacognitive
data, for example). Again, the strategy a child can employ on a training
task is one he cannot use on a novel transfer task unless given further
training. Cognitive abilities are welded, or tightly wired, to specific
domains of competence and therefore not readily available to other domains.
Thus children are not hampered only by being universal novices, for even
when they do gain expertise it tends to be strictly constrained by context.
The ideal adult expert, however, would have ready access, sometimes
even conscious knowledge of his intellectual functions and should be able to
apply rules and regulations widely. The adult's greater accessibility
should enable him to capitalize on past expertise to guide his acquisition
of new skills. Thus he can quickly adopt the interrogative and monitoring
mode of the expert and marshall and modify available skills to meet the
demands of the new task. In other words, the adult knows how to set about
becoming an expert in new domains; he shows significant transfer from a wide
variety of pertinent past experiences.
Summary
I began this section by considering the three dominant theoretical
models in mainstream psychology: learning theory, computer models, and
schema theories. In retrospect, we find that these theories have been less
than informative models of human growth. Let me stress that the models were
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never intended to address issues of species-specific learning and
development and, therefore, they can scarcely be held responsible for the
fact that they failed to do so adequately. Let me further add that we have
learned a great deal of lasting importance from these major movements in
psychology. From learning theory we have found out how to engineer
behavioral change in a wide variety of everyday settings. Behavior
modification programs are, indeed, one of the most successful applications
of psychological principles. From computer models we have learned a great
deal about limited-capacity systems, selective attention, mechanisms for
operating on supraspan material, executive control issues, etc. And from
schema theories we have derived powerful assimilation models of top-down
processing. All of these movements have profoundly influenced our current
conception of the human thinker. The call for a consideration of the
missing model, of comparative psychology, is a call for an added emphasis,
an additional viewpoint to provide a more rounded picture, rather than an
alternative model. This somewhat different perspective brings us closer to
problems of human learning as adaptation to a natural environment with
significant properties of its own. This perspective also makes us at least
aware of the centrality of adaptation, change, and growth to theories of
learning.
Induction: Preliminaries to a Theory p1 Learning
A recurrent theme throughout this paper has been the perennial problem
of how we can characterize growth and change. I have pointed out that the
prototypic theories of the acquisition of expertise and the development of
Learning and Development
44
memory offer little more than an accretion mechanism accompanied by
unspecified reorganization in response to unspecified forces. As I would
like to end on a positive note, I will consider here what we do know about
transition mechanisms and how we might go about examining them more
directly.
Basically, we are trying to understand the processes of induction, of
how one goes from specific learned experiences to the formulation of a
general rule that can be applied to multiple settings. This is the basic
question behind access theories (Brown & Campione, in press; Rozin, 1976):
How does the learner come to use knowledge flexibly? How do isolated skills
become connected together, extended, and generalized? Young children learn
specific rules in constrained contexts and their cognitive skills tend to be
welded to the situations in which they were acquired. With repetition of
many similar experiences, commonalities and differences are noted; the rule
is applied appropriately and inappropriately. Inappropriate application of
rules leads to conflict that induces a modification of the specific rule
into a more powerful hypothesis capable of accounting for a wider range of
phenomena.
Development is the process of going from the specific context-bound to
the general context-free. Note, however, Gardner's (1978) warning that
truly general, context-free, statable laws may be a chimera, an idealized
end point; blatant failure to recognize problem isomorphs occurs in adults
as well as children (Simon & Hayes, 1976; Gick & Holyoak, Note 3).
Knowledge in some sense must always be context bound. But contextual
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binding permits of degrees; generalization and flexibility are not all-or-
none phenomena but continua. It is the range of applicability of any
particular process by any particular learner that forms the diagnosis of
expertise or cognitive maturity. The less mature, less experienced, less
intelligent suffer from a greater degree of contextual binding, but even the
expert is bound by contextual constraint to some degree.
Thus, a key developmental question is how we go from strict contextual
binding to a more powerful general law. One commonly suggested mechanism is
conflict--conflict induces change, a notion basic to dialectic theories
(Wozniak, 1975; Youniss, 1974) as well as Piagetian models (Inhelder,
Sinclair, & Bovet, 1974; Smedslund, 1966). A serviceable hypothesis is
maintained until a counterexample, an invidious generalization, or an
incompatible outcome ensues. Conflict generated by such inconsistencies
induces the formulation of a more powerful rule to account for a greater
range of specific experiences--sometimes!
We cannot, as yet, specify the exact mechanisms that promote change, or
even predict exactly when it will occur. But we are at the stage when it is
possible to study transition mechanisms directly, and several psychologists
interested in developmental issues are beginning to do so. I would advocate
a three-pronged attack on the problem. The first step would be to provide
as rich and detailed a description as possible of the qualitative
differences between experts and novices in any task domain. Next we can
begin to directly address the transition process by observing learning
taking place within a single subject over time. The third step would be to
attempt some form of intervention to engineer change.
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The first step in the three-pronged attack is to map the developmental
progression in rich detail. As we are most adept at describing
developmental sequences, there is no lack of examples to illustrate this
point, either from the adult expertise or developmental literatures. As an
elegant developmental example, consider Siegler's (in press) rule-assessment
approach. Detailed specification is given not only of the correct rule for
solving a variety of scientific reasoning problems--torque, probability,
time, conservation, etc.--but also of the series of increasingly more
powerful partial solutions the learner entertains on his progression towards
the final rule. Similarly, detailed specifications of the developmental
sequence involved in the acquisition of expertise in adults are becoming
increasingly common, so much so that based on such descriptions, computer
models can be designed that are capable of solving, for example, pencil and
paper physics problems in the mode of the expert or the novice (Larkin,
Heller, & Greeno, 1980). In the case of both the child and the adult
scientific thinker, the knowledge base, the exact heuristic procedures, and
the encoding process can be specified in rich detail, and sensitive
diagnosis of the individual's state of learning can be provided. Although
the best examples of detailed developmental descriptions center on the
acquisition of scientific reasoning, in principle there is no reason why
comparable analyses cannot be applied to less structured domains, and such
detailed descriptions are an absolute prerequisite for later stages in a
research program aimed at studying change.
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The second step in the three-pronged attack is to observe learning
actually taking place within a subject over time. This is essentially the
microgenetic approach advocated by Vygotsky (1978) and Werner (1961). The
majority of developmental data is cross-sectional. The performance of
groups of children, varying in age or level of expertise, is compared and
contrasted. Even a great deal of longitudinal research has a surprisingly
cross-sectional flavor in that we tend to see frozen shots of behavior taken
at quite long intervals. Both approaches provide a picture of cognition in
stasis, rather than evolving, as it were, right before one's eyes. But,
again in principle, it is possible to observe learning occurring within a
session, or across a few sessions, if the concept to be acquired is within
the competency of the learner. A recent example of microgenetic analysis
has come, perhaps surprisingly, from the adult literature. Anzai and Simon
(1979) map the stages of learning that a single subject passes through as
she becomes increasingly adept at solving a five-disc Tower of Hanoi
problem. This strategy enables them not only to concentrate on qualitative
descriptions of the stages of expertise, but also to consider transition
phenomena and self-modification techniques underlying the progression from
beginning to expert strategies. Anzai and Simon's learning-by-doing theory
(adaptive production system) is just one example of current interest in self-
modifying computer programs focused on learning processes (Anderson, Kline,
& Beasley, Note 4). A similar focus on within-subject learning-by-doing in
children is the strong motivation for current programs on discovery learning
and zone of potential development assessments that are being developed
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(Brown & French, 1979; Campione, Brown, & Ferrara, Note 10; Bransford,
Stein, Shelton, & Owings, 1980).
The final step in the three-pronged attack on learning mechanisms is to
attempt to engineer change via intervention. Training studies in general
have been a traditional tool of the developmental psychologist and are
becoming of increasing importance for both practical and applied reasons
(Brown & Campione, 1978; in press; Larkin, Heller, & Greeno, 1980; Brown &
Chi, Note 2). Although there are many methods of intervention, the
essential element is that the experimenter provides feedback and direction.
It is the experimenter who undertakes the requisite task analyses, on the
basis of which he or she provides for the appropriate level of task
difficulty and the correct mix of conflict trials and confirmed
expectations.
Inducing change via intervention is of necessity an interactive
process, one that is implicitly involved in, for example, attempts to induce
more mature concepts of torque or time (Siegler, in press), and explicitly
involved in, for example, mediated learning experiences (Feuerstein, 1980)
and clinical testing based on Vygotsky's (1978) theory of a zone of
potential development (Brown & French, 1979). The essential idea is that a
child's (novice's) performance on the initial presentation of a problem is
only part of the picture, and probably represents a poor estimate of his or
her current cognitive capabilities. To complete the picture, we need to
consider the degree of competence the child can achieve with aid. Via the
intervention of a supportive, knowledgeable other (an adult, an expert,
etc.), the child is led to the limits of his or her own understanding.
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Mediated learning experiences, i.e., learning via the mediation of a
helpful expert who provides hints, clues, counterexamples, etc., is the
essence of both the Feuerstein (1980) diagnostic and training programs and
the very similar programs based on Vygotsky's theory of a zone of potential
development (Brown & French, 1979). In order to design either program, one
must consider all stages of the three-pronged attack. First, both programs
should involve detailed task analyses of the learning domain. Second, both
provide an opportunity to observe learning occurring; they are essentially
microgenetic approaches. And finally, in both, change is induced via the
intervention of a more knowledgeable supportive other, Because of these
features, these approaches to learning offer ideal ways to study induction.
Although the supportive other in the laboratory is usually the
experimenter, these interactive learning experiences are intended to mimic
real-life learning. Mothers (Wertsch, 1978, 1979), teachers (Schallert &
Kleiman, 1979) and mastercraftsmen (Childs & Greenfield, 1980) all function
as the supportive other, the agent of change responsible for structuring the
child's environment in such a way that he or she will experience a judicious
mix of compatible and conflicting experiences. Note also that inadequate
mediated learning, either mother-child or teacher-pupil, has been implicated
as a potential cause of the poor academic performance of the culturally
deprived (Brown, 1977, 1978; Feuerstein, 1979). Finally, the importance of
such interactive learning experiences for cognitive development, as stressed
in Vygotsky's theory (1978), should not be overlooked. Vygotsky believed
that all cognitive experiences are initially social but, in time, the
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results of such experiences become internalized. Initially the supportive
other acts as the interrogator, leading the child to more powerful rules and
generalizations. The interrogative, regulatory role, however, becomes
internalized in the process of development, and the child becomes able to
fulfill some of these functions for himself via self-regulation and self-
interrogation. Mature thinkers are those who provide conflict trials for
themselves, practice thought experiments, question their own basic
assumptions, provide counterexamples to their own rules, etc. In short,
while a great deal of thinking and learning may remain a social activity
(Brown & French, 1979; Cole, Hood, & McDermott, Note 9), through the process
of internalization, the mature reasoner becomes capable of providing the
supportive other role for himself.
In summary, I have suggested that a three-pronged approach to the study
of learning is desirable, necessary and even possible. Each step would
serve a complementary function in contributing to our knowledge about
learning processes. If, as a result of such an attack, we become able to
(a) describe the stages of development, i.e., model developmental
progressions and trajectories within a domain, (b) describe self-
modification processes in individual learners acquiring expertise, and
(c) engineer transition by the provision of appropriate experience, we must
come to understand the essential elements of learning.
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. An organizational framework for exploring questions about
learning. (Adapted from Jenkins, 1978, and Bransford, 1979)
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